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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JOAN WILLIAMSON, 
Petitioner/Appellant, ] 
v s . ] 
STUART KIM WILLIAMSON, ) 
Respondent/Appellee. ] 
) Case No. 980245-CA 
Trial Court No. 9541002 07DA 
Priority No. 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to the Constitution of Utah, Article VIII, Section 1 et 
seg., Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h), and Rules 3 and 4 of the 
Utah R. App. P. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court commit error in failing to make 
findings on nearly all material issues, including: 
A. Whether Stuart Williamson's $3,550.00 per month 
income at the time of his involuntary termination from Morton 
International, Inc. due to unsatisfactory job performance should 
be imputed to Stuart Williamson for purposes of child support and 
alimony. 
B. Whether Stuart Williamson is voluntarily 
underemployed at $11.00 per hour when there is employment 
available to him at $13.00 to $15.00 per hour. 
C. The effect of a new spouse's contributions to 
Stuart Williamson's household on Stuart Williamson's needs and 
ability to pay alimony. 
D. The parties' needs and respective ability to meet 
those needs relative to alimony, and equalization of the parties' 
respective standards of living. 
E. The reasonableness of Joan Williamson's attorney 
fees and costs and the relative ability of the parties to pay 
attorney fees and costs. 
Applicable Standard of Review. As stated in Whitehouse v. 
Whitehouse, 790 P.2d 57,71 (Utah App. 1990): ". . . the trial 
court must make findings on all material issues, and its failure 
to delineate what circumstances have changed and why these 
changes support the modification made in the prior divorce decree 
constitutes reversible error unless the facts in the record are 
clear, uncontroverted and only support the judgment." In 
addition, "findings should be sufficiently detailed and include 
enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the 
ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached." Acton v. 
Delirian, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987). 
Citation to Record Showing Issue was Reserved in Trial 
Court. Petition to Modify, R. at 116-20, Answer to Petition to 
Modify, R. at 121-22, Amended Petition to Modify, R. at 141-46, 
Amended Answer to Petition to Modify, R. at 147-48, and 
Transcript throughout. 
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2. Did the trial court commit error in failing to award 
Joan Williamson continued alimony even based upon the trial court 
findings of $2,090.00 monthly income to Stuart Williamson and 
$1,692.00 monthly income to Joan Williamson which is a $400.00 
per month income disparity. 
Applicable Standard of Review. As stated in Ruhsam v. 
Ruhsam, 742 P.2d 123, 124, (Utah App. 1987): 
It is well established that in divorces trial courts 
are given considerable discretion in adjusting the 
parties' financial and property interests, and their 
actions are entitled to a presumption of validity. 
Burnham v. Burnham, 716 P.2d 781, 782 (Utah 1986); 
Savage v. Savage, 658 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah 1983). To 
overcome the presumption, the appealing party must 
demonstrate that "there was a misunderstanding or 
misapplication of the law resulting in substantial and 
prejudicial error; or the evidence clearly 
preponderated against the findings; or such a serious 
inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of 
discretion." Pope v. Pope, 589 P.2d 752, 753 (Utah 
1978); see also Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 395, 397 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1978); Boyle v. Boyle, 735 P.2d 669, 670-71 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Citation to Record Showing Issue was Reserved in Trial 
Court, Petition to Modify, R. at 116-20, Answer to Petition to 
Modify, R. at 121-22, Amended Petition to Modify, R. at 141-46, 
Amended Answer to Petition to Modify, R. at 147-48, and 
Transcript throughout. 
3. Did the trial court commit error in failing to award 
Joan Williamson her attorney fees and costs. 
Applicable Standard of Review. As stated in Wilde v. Wilde, 
P.2d , 357 U.A.R. 29, 31 (Utah App. 1998): 
Both the decision to award attorney fees and the 
amount of such fees are within the trial court's sound 
discretion. See Crouse v. douse, 817 P.2d 836, 839 
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(Utah Ct. App. 1991). However, "the award [or denial 
of such fees] must be based on evidence of the 
financial need of the receiving spouse, the ability of 
the other spouse to pay, and the reasonableness of the 
requested fees." Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 493 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1991). Failure to consider these factors is* 
grounds for reversal on the fee issue. See Marshall v. 
Marshall, 915 P.2d 508, 517 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
Citation to Record Showing Issue was Reserved in Trial 
Court. Petition to Modify, R. at 116-20, Answer to Petition to 
Modify, R. at 121-22, Amended Petition to Modify, R. at 141-46, 
Amended Answer to Petition to Modify, R. at 147-48, and 
Transcript pages 145, lines 15-23, page 161, lines 9-16. 
4. Whether Joan Williamson should be awarded her attorney 
fees and costs on appeal. 
Applicable Standard of Review. As stated in Lynqle v. 
Lvngle, 831 P.2d 1027 (Utah App. 1992): 
Generally, when the trial court awards fees 
in a domestic action to the party who then 
substantially prevails on appeal, fees will 
also be awarded to that party on appeal. See 
Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d 836, 840 (Utah 
App, 1991). 
APPLICABLE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.6(6) and (7): 
(6) Gross income includes income imputed to 
the parent under Subsection (7). 
(7)(a) Income may not be imputed to a parent 
unless the parent stipulates to the amount 
imputed or a hearing is held and a finding 
made that the parent is voluntarily 
unemployed or underemployed. 
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the 
income shall be based upon employment 
potential and probable earnings as derived 
from work history, occupation qualifications, 
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and prevailing earnings for persons of 
similar backgrounds in the community. 
(c) If a parent has no recent work 
history, income shall be imputed at least at 
the federal minimum wage for a 4 0-hour work 
week. To impute a greater income, the judge 
in a judicial proceeding or the presiding 
officer in an administrative proceeding shall 
enter specific findings of fact as to the 
evidentiary basis for the imputation. 
(d) Income may not be imputed if any of 
the following conditions exist: 
(i) the reasonable costs of child care 
for the parents' minor children approach or 
equal the amount of income the custodial 
parent can earn; 
(ii) a parent is physically or 
mentally disabled to the extent he cannot earn 
minimum wage; 
(iii) a parent is engaged in career or 
occupational training to establish basic job 
skills; or 
(iv) unusual emotional or physical 
needs of a child require the custodial 
parent's presence in the home. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (7) (a), (d), and (g): 
(7)(a) The court shall consider at least the 
following factors in determining alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of 
the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or 
ability to produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to 
provide support; and 
(iv) the length of the marriage. 
(d) The court may, under appropriate 
circumstances, attempt to equalize the 
parties' respective standards of living. 
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(g) (i) The court has continuing 
jurisdiction to make substantive changes and 
new orders regarding alimony based on a 
substantial material change in circumstances 
not foreseeable at the time of the divorce. 
(ii) The court may not modify alimony 
or issue a new order for alimony to address 
needs of the recipient that did not exist at 
the time the decree was entered, unless the 
court finds extenuating circumstances that 
justify that action. 
(iii) In determining alimony, the 
income of any subsequent spouse of the payor 
may not be considered, except as provided in 
this subsection. 
(A) The court may consider the 
subsequent spouse's financial ability to 
share living expenses. 
(B) The court may consider the income 
or a subsequent spouse if the court finds 
that the payor's improper conduct justifies 
that consideration. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3 (1): 
(1) In any action filed under Title 30, 
Chapter 3, 4, or 6, and in any action to 
establish an order of custody, visitation, 
child support, alimony, or division of 
property in a domestic case, the court may 
order a party to pay the costs, attorney 
fees, and witness fees, including expert 
witness fees, of the other party to enable 
the other party to prosecute or defend the 
action. The order may include provision for 
costs of the action. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. This is a case involving 
modification of the child support provision and termination 
of the alimony provision of a Decree of Divorce. 
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B. Course of Proceedings. 
1. The parties were divorced by Decree of Divorce 
entered May 2, 1996. 
2. On or about September 27, 1996, Stuart Williamson 
filed a Petition to Modify the child support provisions of the 
Decree of Divorce. On or about October 3, 1997, Stuart 
Williamson filed an Amended Petition to Modify seeking 
termination of the alimony provided in the Decree of Divorce. 
3. Trial was held on Stuart Williamson's petition on 
February 11, 1998. 
4. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order 
Modifying Decree of Divorce were entered March 25, 1998. 
5. Joan Williamson filed her Notice of Appeal on 
April 22, 1998. 
C. Disposition in the Trial Court: Finding that the 
incomes were different than at the time of the Decree of Divorce, 
the trial court found a "substantial change in circumstances", 
reduced child support, terminated alimony, and ordered each party 
to pay her/his own attorney fees and costs. 
D. Statement of Facts Relevant to the Issues Presented for 
Review: 
1. Joan Williamson and Stuart Williamson were married 
23 plus years. The parties have two children, one of whom, 
Julie, was born September 23, 1985, is still a minor and is in 
the custody of Joan Williamson. R. 48,66,67, and 82. T. page 
130, lines 2-4. 
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2. Joan Williamson and Stuart Williamson were 
divorced by Decree of Divorce entered May 24, 1996. R. 82-96. A 
copy of the Decree of Divorce is included in the Addendum. The 
Decree of Divorce was based upon a Stipulation of the parties. R. 
3. The Decree of Divorce provided for child support 
and alimony as follows: 
4. [Stuart Williamson] shall pay to 
[Joan Williamson] the sum of $368.00 per 
month as child support until such time as the 
payments are no longer due, which shall be 
when the child turns 18 or would graduate 
from high school with her normal high school 
class, whichever occurs later. . . . 
6. [Stuart Williamson] shall maintain 
health, medical and dental insurance on the 
minor child of the parties. . . . 
8. [Stuart Williamson] is required to 
pay [Joan Williamson] alimony in the sum of 
$425.00 per month until [Joan Williamson] 
remarries or cohabits as defined in Utah Code 
§ 30-3-5, or either party dies. Alimony 
shall commence July 1, 1995. 
4. At the time of the divorce, Stuart Williamson was 
employed at Morton International, Inc. where he earned 
approximately $3,550.00 per month. Joan Williamson was employed 
at Bourns where she earned approximately $1,442.00 per month. R. 
61,77, and 92. T. page 12, lines 13-24. 
5. On or about September 27, 1996, Stuart Williamson 
filed a Petition to Modify the child support provisions of the 
Decree of Divorce. R. 116-20. On or about October 3, 1997, 
Stuart Williamson filed an Amended Petition to Modify which added 
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a request to modify the alimony provision of the Decree of 
Divorce. R. 141-467. 
6. Stuart Williamson was "involuntarily terminated" 
from his employment at Morton International, Inc. by a letter 
dated August 29, 1996 which stated the reason for termination to 
be "violation of Company Policy; specifically unsatisfactory 
performance of job responsibilities." The letter also stated 
that Stuart Williamson could request review of his termination: 
"If you are dissatisfied with any aspect of your termination, you 
may review the Morton Automotive Safety Products Employee 
Handbook as it pertains to the Employee Grievance Process." 
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 4 (also attached to Addendum); T. page 
12, line 25; page 13, lines 1-3; page 16, lines 2-6; page 16, 
lines 19-25; page 17; page 18, lines 1-5; page 23, lines 13-25; 
pages 24-32; page 33, lines 1-9; page 95, lines 18-25; page 96; 
page 97, lines 1-3. 
7. Previous to his termination, Stuart Williamson 
received a "Notice of Caution" in October, 1995 involving an 
incident where he used "offensive language [and] inappropriate 
conduct" toward a co-worker. Stuart Williamson was told that 
"Further violation will result in disciplinary action up to [and] 
including termination." T. page 22 lines 12-25; page 23, lines 
1-12; page 33, lines 10-25; page 34; page 35, lines 1-5. 
Defendant's Exhibit No. 3; Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 3. 
8. Stuart Williamson testified that he did not 
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slur his co-workers in August, 1996 and that he felt there 
was no justification for Morton International, Inc. to 
terminate his employment. T. page 30, lines 3-25; pages 31-34; 
Three co-workers testified that they did not personally hear 
Stuart Williamson slur his co-workers in August, 1996. T. page 
97, lines 18-25; pages 98-119; page 120, lines 1-21. 
9. Stuart Williamson testified that he did not seek 
review of his termination nor seek legal redress because he 
didn't think it would do any good. T. page 77, lines 21-25; page 
78, lines 1-17. Joan Williamson testified that Stuart 
Williamson's not seeking review or legal redress was unlike the 
Stuart Williamson she was married to for 24 years, who testified 
was "a fighter", "not a quitter", and she could not "see him if 
he was wrongly dismissed just to walk away from it." T. page 
135, lines 12-25; page 136, lines 1-6. 
10. Not only did Stuart Williamson lose his $3,550.00 
per month income, he also lost the health, medical and dental 
insurance that he had on the parties' minor child. T. page 79, 
lines 18-25; page 80, lines 1-10. 
11. Stuart Williamson obtained new employment with his 
brother's drywall company where he is paid $11.00 per hour. T. 
page 36, lines 1-5. 
12. Stuart Williamson, and his brother Kirk Williamson 
for whom Stuart Williamson works, testified that because of age 
and health concerns, Stuart Williamson was not as productive as 
he once was. T. page 14, lines 16-25; page 15, lines 1-20; page 
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55, lines 9-25, pages 56-57; page 58, lines 1-6; page 122, lines 
1-22; page 124, lines 24-25; page 125; page 126, lines 1-11. 
13. Kim Pitcher, a drywall contractor who employs some 
40 drywall workers, testified that someone of Stuart Williamson's 
experience and given Stuart Williamson's age and health concerns, 
which he testified were similar to his own, Stuart Williamson 
could earn $13.00 to $15.00 per hour: 
Mr. Jones. Okay. And a good, good 
drywaller, good taper would have to be pretty 
banged up not to be able to at least meet a, 
an expected performance level? 
A. Well, I don't know what [Stuart 
Williamson] does. If he's a taper-- I, I 
tape too and I'm not as fast as I used to be. 
I'm 45. And, I, I just don't make as much if 
I'm out here working. But I can still 
produce. 
Q. Okay. 
A. And I've kind of got the same 
symptoms he's got so. . . 
Q. How much could you make as a taper 
do you think paying yourself? 
A. Well, I think I'm still around $13 
an hour, $13 to $15. 
Q. And on a piece rate? 
A. I think about that. 
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Q. Pardon me? 
A. About that, yes. 
Q. About $13 to $15 an hour? 
A. About $13 to $15. 
T. page 68, lines 16-25; page 69, lines 1-14. 
Stuart Williamson himself testified that he "could make probably 
$12.25" per hour. T. page 40, lines 1-2. 
14. Stuart Williamson did drywall work on the side 
while employed at Morton International, Inc. and while employed 
by his brother. T. page 146, lines 11-25; page 147, lines 1-7; 
page 162, lines 15-25; page 163, lines 1-6. 
15. Joan Williamson's income at Bourns increased from 
$8.32 per hour at the time of the divorce (May, 1996) to $9.23 
per hour at the time of the modification trial (February, 1998). 
T. page 132, lines 12-25; page 133, line 1. Joan Williamson had 
some overtime at Bourns in 1997. T. page 156, lines 7-14. Joan 
Williamson took an additional part-time job at King's, a 
department store, in September, 1997 to supplement her income 
when Stuart Williamson stopped paying her alimony. T. page 141, 
lines 8-19; page 154 lines 10-25; page 155, lines 1-19. 
16. The trial court made no findings on the parties' 
monthly needs at the time of trial or at the time of the parties' 
divorce. R. 196-201. s-
17. At trial, Joan Williamson presented a monthly 
budget of $2,288.35 for herself and the parties' daughter. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 9; T. page 142, lines 16-25; pages 143-
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144. Joan Williamson testified that her budget was tight, which 
is why she had the second job to help ends meet, and that the 
budget put her "somewhat" equal to the standard of living that 
she enjoyed while married to Stuart Williamson. T. page 144, 
lines 12-25. 
18. At trial, Stuart Williamson presented a monthly 
budget of $1,811.00 which included in it the $252.06 in monthly 
child support he figured he owed to Joan Williamson, a $989.00 
monthly mortgage payment on a mortgage which he took out at the 
time of divorce in order that Stuart Williamson be able to pay to 
Joan Williamson $65,000.00 for her equity interest in the 
parties' home which Stuart Williamson was awarded in the divorce, 
and a VISA bill which was incurred so that he could "pay support" 
to Joan Williamson. Defendant's Exhibit No. 1; T. page 45, lines 
2-25; pages 46-49; page 50, lines 1-22. 
19. The trial court found Stuart Williamson's income 
at Williamson Drywall, Inc. to be $2,090.00 per month. R. 197 
(Findings of Fact numbered paragraph 7); T. page 180, lines 16-
18. 
20. The trial court found Joan Williamson's income, 
including some overtime at Bourns, and Joan Williamson's second 
job where she earned $75.00 per month, to be a total of $1,692.00 
per month at the time of trial. R. 197 (Findings of Fact, 
numbered paragraph 9); T. page 181, lines 17-21. The trial court 
found Joan Williamson's 1997 income was $1,832.66 per month. R. 
13 
at 197 (Findings of Fact numbered paragraph 8); T. page 181, 
lines 15-17. 
21. After making its findings on the income of the 
parties, the trial court ruled: "I'm going to terminate alimony. 
Now to make this effective, and the Court paints this in broad 
strokes, I've often said that in the past and I'll reemphasize 
that here today." T. page 181, lines 22-25. Joan Williamson's 
counsel pressed the Court on the alimony issue, pointing out the 
$400.00 per month income disparity even on the Court's finding of 
the parties' income, to which the trial court said that it was 
"close enough" and that in so concluding the trial court was 
deducting Stuart Williamson's child support payment from Stuart 
Williamson's income and adding Stuart Williamson's child support 
to Joan Williamson's income: 
THE JUDGE: I appreciate that, 
Counsel, but when you take into account the 
child support that he would pay and that she 
would receive and their actual incomes, 
etcetera, the Court finds that's close 
enough. 
MR. JONES: Well but even if you do that, 
Your Honor, you take $200 off of hers you'd end up 
with $1,443. Take $250 off of his you end up at 
$1,840. 
THE JUDGE: They're within $10 0. 
MR. JONES: You're still $400. 
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THE JUDGE: No you're not, Counsel. 
Your figures are different than mine. 
MR. JONES: Well, I'm, I'm looking at the 
child support worksheet, Your Honor. What Your 
Honor said was, and I-- Please just hear me out. 
THE JUDGE: Sure. 
MR. JONES: I'm not trying to argue 
with the Court. 
THE JUDGE: Go ahead. 
MR. JONES: But I have a real concern 
here because I think that the Court's ruling 
is clearly contrary to the case law--
THE JUDGE: All right. 
MR. JONES: -- in a long-term 
marriage. 
THE JUDGE: All right. He's 
basically making $2,100.00 gross. 
MR. JONES: $2,100. 
THE JUDGE: She's basically making $1,700 
gross. 
MR. JONES: Oh, we11 now you're 
rounding out. 
THE JUDGE: Yes. 
MR. JONES: But say it's the $400, 
$2,100 and $1,700. You take $200 off of hers 
for child support that makes it 15. You take 
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$200, it would be $270 or something off of 
his, that makes it 18. $300. 21 minus 3 is 
18. 17 minus 2 is 15. So there's $3 00 even 
on your, your numbers that you're essentially 
spinning up. There's still an income 
disparity of $3 00 bending over backwards to 
his numbers. 
THE JUDGE: Well I appreciate your 
manipulation. But he's making $2,100, she's 
making $1,700. He gives her $250, she gets 
$250. And he's $100 in the hole. That 's 
the way the Court looks at it. 
MR. JONES: Well but Your Honor, but 
that doesn't--
THE JUDGE: End of story, Mr. Jones. 
Court will be in recess. 
T. page 184, lines 2-25, page 185; page 186, lines 1-2. 
22. The trial court accepted both parties' proffer of 
$1,500 attorney fees. T. page 145, lines 15-23; page 161, lines 
9-16. Without making any findings, the trial court ordered each 
party to pay her/his own attorney fees and costs. R. 196-203; T. 
page 183, lines 1-2. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I 
The trial court's findings are not sufficiently detailed to 
disclose the evidentiary basis for the trial court's decision to 
I 
lower child support, terminate alimony, and require each party to 
pay her/his own attorney fees and costs in this case. With 
regard to child support, the trial court made no finding as to 
whether Stuart Williamson's involuntary termination from Morton 
International, Inc. due to unsatisfactory job performance, and 
Stuart Williamson's taking a job with his brother for $11.00 per 
hour instead of the $13.00 to $15.00 he was capable of earning, 
rendered Stuart Williamson voluntarily underemployed pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.6(6) and (7). 
As to alimony, in addition to the voluntary underemployment 
argument above, the trial court made no finding as to the 
financial condition of Joan Williamson, Stuart Williamson's 
ability to pay alimony, and the length of the marriage as 
required by Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 7(a). The trial court found 
only that Stuart Williamson was terminated from Morton 
International, Inc., has obtained employment at $11.00 per hour, 
which with some overtime computed to $2,090.00 per month in 
earnings, and that Joan Williamson's income was $1,692.00 per 
month which included some overtime and income from a part-time 
job. Based on the findings of "earnings", the trial court found 
a substantial change of circumstances and reduced child support 
and terminated alimony. 
Where the trial court made no findings on the parties' needs 
or ability to pay for purposes of alimony, it is not known 
whether Joan Williamson's alimony was terminated by the trial 
court due to Stuart Williamson's child support obligation to Joan 
17 
Williamson, a mortgage taken to pay Joan Williamson's equity 
interest in the parties' home, and Stuart Williamson's VISA bill 
incurred to pay Stuart Williamson's support obligations to Joan 
Williamson. It is also not known whether Stuart Williamson's new 
spouse's contribution to Stuart Williamson's household were 
considered as allowed by Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7) (g) (iii) (A) . 
As to attorney fees and costs, the trial court made no 
findings as to the parties' need or ability to pay attorney fees 
and costs. 
This case should be sent back to the trial court to make 
findings which address the issues raised at trial in sufficient 
detail to disclose how the trial court reached its ultimate 
conclusions in this case. 
II 
Even accepting the trial court's finding placing Stuart 
Williamson's monthly income at $2,090.00 and Joan Williamson's 
monthly income $1,692.00, there is still a $400.00 per month 
income disparity. Also, the parties' monthly needs presented to 
the trial court established Joan Williamson's greater need and 
Stuart Williamson's ability to meet his own needs and still pay 
alimony. Joan Williamson's need was $2,288.35 per month and 
Stuart Williamson's need was $1,811.00 per month which included 
his child support payment to Joan Williamson, Stuart Williamson's 
mortgage taken out to pay Joan Williamson her $65,000.00 property 
settlement payment in the divorce, and Stuart Williamson's VISA 
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bill to pay for money borrowed to pay his support obligations to 
Joan Williamson. 
This case involves a marriage of 23 years and two children, 
one of whom is still a minor. The trial court's subtracting 
child support from Stuart Williamson's income and adding it to 
Joan Williamson's income without recognizing that Joan Williamson 
also has a child support obligation makes no sense. The trial 
court's termination of alimony leaves Joan Williamson to support 
two people on the same income as Stuart Williamson has to support 
only himself, and his household expenses are being shared by a 
new spouse. 
Also, Where the parties' child is now 13 years old, child 
support will only be owed for 5 more years. The parties were 
married for 23 years and the Decree of Divorce in this case 
provided that alimony continue until Joan Williamson's remarriage 
or cohabitation of either parties' death. 
The trial court's termination of alimony, even on its 
limited finding of monthly income, was an abuse of discretion and 
should be reversed and the alimony payment to Joan Williamson 
reinstated back to the date the trial court terminated the 
alimony and the alimony should be in an amount of at least 
$200.00 per month so that the parties' respective standards of 
living may be more equalized. 
Ill 
The trial court accepted both parties' proffer of $1,500.00 
attorney fees. Without making any findings, the trial court 
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ordered each to pay her/his own attorney fees. Where Stuart 
Williamson has the greater income earning ability and greater 
ability to pay attorney fees, Joan Williamson should be awarded 
her attorney fees both in the trial court and on appeal. 
ARGUMENTS 
I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT ARE LEGALLY 
INSUFFICIENT IN THIS CASE. 
As stated in the "Issues Presented on Review", the trial 
court failed to make findings on nearly all issues, including 
A. Whether Stuart Williamson's $3,550.00 per month 
income at the time of his involuntary termination from Morton 
International, Inc. due to unsatisfactory job performance should 
be imputed to Stuart Williamson for purposes of child support and 
alimony. 
B. Whether Stuart Williamson is voluntarily 
underemployed at $11.00 per hour when there is employment 
available to him at $13.00 to $15.00 per hour. 
C. The effect of a new spouse's contributions to 
Stuart Williamson's household on Stuart Williamson's needs and 
ability to pay alimony. 
D. The parties' needs and respective ability to meet 
those needs relative to alimony, and equalization of the parties' 
respective standards of living. 
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E. The reasonableness of Joan Williamson's attorney 
fees and costs and the relative ability of the parties to pay 
attorney fees and costs. 
At trial, Joan Williamson argued that because Stuart 
Williamson was involuntarily terminated due to unsatisfactory job 
performance, the full $3,550.00 per month that he was earning at 
the time of trial should be imputed to him and there should be no 
substantial change of circumstances and therefore no reduction of 
child support and no termination of alimony. 
The evidence showed that Stuart Williamson was underemployed 
in that he could earn $13.00 to $15.00 per hour instead of the 
$11.00 per hour he was actually earning and on which the trial 
court found Stuart Williamson's current income. Stuart 
Williamson himself testified that he could $12.25 per hour. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.6(6) and (7) allows income to be 
imputed for purposes of child support if "a hearing is held and a 
finding made that the parent is voluntarily unemployed or 
underemployed." In imputing income, the trial court must base 
the income "upon employment potential and probable earnings as 
derived from work history, occupation qualifications, and 
prevailing earnings for persons of similar backgrounds in the 
community." 
As stated in Griffith v. Griffith, P.2d , 344 
U.A.R. (Utah App. 1998), "the goal of imputing income is to 
prevent parents from reducing their child support or alimony by 
purposeful unemployment or underemployment." 
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The trial court made no finding relative to Stuart 
Williamson's working a second job during and since the parties' 
marriage. As held in Crompton v. Crompton, 888 P.2d 686, 689 
(Utah App. 1994) with regard to alimony: "A trial court must be 
able to consider all sources of income that were used by the 
parties during the marriage to meet their self-defined needs, 
from whatever source--overtime, second job, self employment, 
etc., as well as unearned income." 
In this case, the trial court made no finding on whether 
Stuart Williamson was voluntarily underemployed despite 
substantial evidence relative to his involuntary termination due 
to unsatisfactory job performance, greater employment potential, 
a long work history of greater income, a long work history of 
second job income, and significant occupation qualifications even 
as a drywaller. 
The trial court made no finding relative to Stuart 
Williamson's new spouse's contribution to Stuart Williamson's 
household though Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7)(g)(iii)(A) authorizes 
the trial court to do so. 
The trial court made no findings as to Joan Williamson's 
financial condition and needs, the ability of Stuart Williamson 
to provide support, and the length of the marriage as required by 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7)(a)(i)-(iv). The evidence showed that 
Joan Williamson's monthly needs were nearly $2,288.35 while 
Stuart Williamson's were only $1,811.00 which even included his 
child support payment to Joan Williamson, Stuart Williamson's 
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mortgage payment for the $65,000.00 borrowed to pay Joan 
Williamson for her equity interest in the parties' home, and 
Stuart Williamson's VISA payment for money borrowed to pay Joan 
Williamson her support. 
The trial court made no findings relative to equalizing the 
parties' respective standards of living which the trial court may 
do in appropriate cases. Utah Code Ann § 30-3-5(7) (d). A 
marriage of 23 plus years warrants an equalization of the 
parties' respective standards of living. 
The trial court accepted both parties' proffers of $1,500.00 
attorney fees but made no finding of reasonableness or need which 
the trail court may do pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3(1). 
Rule 52 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure the trial 
courts in action of this kind to "find the facts specially and 
state separately its conclusions thereon." As stated in Hall v. 
Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1021 (Utah App. 1993) (quoting Allred v. 
Allred, 797 P.2d 1108, 1111 (Utah App. 1990) : "Findings are 
adequate only if they are 'sufficiently detailed and include 
enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the 
ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached.'" 
The only finding of the trial court in this case is as to 
current monthly income. 
Where the trial court's findings are limited to the only one 
of the many issues before the trial court, Joan Williamson should 
not be required to "engage in a futile marshalling exercise". 
Campbell v. Campbell, 896 P.2d 635, 638, (Utah App. 1995), 
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(citing Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474, 477-78 (Utah App. 
1991)). 
As stated in Godfrey v. Godfrey, 854 P.2d 585, 589 (Utah 
App. 1993): 
Indeed, Utah Courts have held that "[a]n 
alimony award should, after a marriage . . . 
and to the extent possible, equalize the 
parties' respective standards of living and 
maintain them at a level as close as possible 
to that standard of living enjoyed during the 
marriage." Gardner v. Gardner, 74 8 P.2d 
1076, 1081 (Utah 1988); see also Jones v. 
Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985); 
Roberts v. Roberts, 835 P.2d 193, 198 (Utah 
App. 1992); Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 491 
(Utah App. 1991). In light of this goal, the 
trial court must consider: "(1) the financial 
conditions and needs of the receiving spouse; 
(2) the ability of the receiving spouse to 
produce a sufficient income; and (3) the 
ability of the supporting spouse to provide 
support." Roberts, 835 P.2d at 198; see also 
Jones, 700 P.2d at 1075; Chambers, 840 P.2d 
at 843; Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84, 
90 (Utah App. 1989). 
Failure to consider these factors in 
fashioning an alimony award constitutes an 
abuse of discretion. Bell, 810 P.2d at 492. 
Accordingly, "the trial court must make 
sufficient detailed findings of fact on each 
factor . . . unless the record is clear and 
uncontroverted" and capable of supporting 
only a finding in favor of the trial court's 
award. .Id.; see also Chambers, 840 P.2d at 
843; Roberts, 835 P.2d at 198. 
As to a finding with regard to Joan Williamson's attorney 
fees and costs, please see "Issues Presented on Appeal", numbered 
paragraph 3, above. 
This case should be reversed and the $368.00 child support 
and $425.00 alimony set forth in the Decree of Divorce should be 
reinstated. In the alternative, this case should be remanded to 
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the trial court for findings relative to Stuart Williamson's 
voluntary underemployment by virtue of his involuntary 
termination due to unsatisfactory job performance, working at 
$11.00 per hour when he could earn $13.00 to $15.00 per hour, 
Joan Williamson's needs and Stuart Williamson's ability to pay 
alimony, and the reasonableness of Joan Williamson's attorney 
fees and Joan Williamson's need and the parties' relative ability 
to pay Joan Williamson's attorney fees and costs. 
II 
JOAN WILLIAMSON IS ENTITLED TO SUBSTANTIAL, LONG TERM 
ALIMONY AND THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
FAILING TO SO PROVIDE 
This case involved a 23 year plus marriage. The parties had 
2 children one of whom is still a minor (Julie, age 13) and is 
Joan Williamson's custody. The parties' Decree of Divorce, based 
on a Stipulation, provided for $368.00 per month child support 
and $425.00 per month alimony. Due to no fault whatever of Joan 
Williamson, Stuart Williamson was involuntarily terminated from 
his employment due to unsatisfactory job performance, lost his 
$3,550.00 per month income and health, medical and dental 
insurance on the parties' minor child, and Stuart Williamson took 
a job at $11.00 per hour with his brother when he could have 
obtained employment at $13.0 0 to $15.0 0 per hour. 
However, even if the foregoing is upheld, there exists a 
nearly $400.00 income disparity between Joan Williamson's and 
Stuart Williamson's current incomes as found by the trial court. 
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Though not found by the trial court, Joan Williamson 
testified that her monthly needs were $2,288.35. Stuart 
Williamson testified that his needs were $1,811.00 - and that 
included his child support payment to Joan Williamson, Stuart 
Williamson's mortgage payment on the $65,000.00 borrowed to pay 
Joan Williamson her equity from the parties' home, and Stuart 
Williamson's VISA bill incurred to pay Joan Williamson her 
support. 
As stated by the Utah Supreme Court on numerous occasions: 
An alimony award should, as far as possible, 
equalize the parties' respective standards of 
living and maintain them at a level as close 
as possible to the standard of living enjoyed 
during the marriage. In determining the 
amount of alimony to be awarded, it was 
necessary for the trial court to consider the 
financial condition and needs of the 
Plaintiff, her ability to produce a 
sufficient income for herself, and the 
ability of the Defendant to provide support 
Olson v. Olson, 704 P.2d 564, 556 (Utah 1985) (footnotes 
omitted). See also English v. English, 565 P.2d 409 (Utah 1977) 
and Higlev v. Higley, 676 P.2d 379 (Utah 1983). 
An equalization of income in this case even on the trial 
court's finding of current income would require an alimony award 
of at least $200.00 per month. 
The trial court's adding Stuart Williamson's child support 
payment to Joan Williamson's income is an abuse of discretion. 
In so doing, the trial court is essentially requiring Joan 
Williamson herself to pay Stuart Williamson's child support 
obligation. 
26 
The trial court's termination of alimony is also an abuse of 
discretion. In their Stipulation, which was incorporated into 
the Decree of Divorce, the parties agreed that alimony be paid 
until Joan Williamson's remarriage or cohabitation or the death 
of either party. The parties' minor child is only 13. When the 
child is 18 the parties will only have been divorced 6 or so 
years. Under the trial court's ruling, Joan Williamson would 
presumably be precluded from having her alimony reinstated after 
the parties' minor child reaches 18 because it may be construed 
as being reasonably contemplated at this time. As stated in 
Johnson v. Johnson, 855 P.2d 250, 253 (Utah App 1993): 
. . . where a future change in circumstances 
is contemplated by the trial court in the 
divorce decree, the fulfillment of that 
future change will not constitute a material 
change of circumstances sufficient to modify 
the award. "A change in circumstances 
reasonably contemplated at the time of 
divorce is not legally cognizable as a 
substantial change in circumstances in 
modification proceedings." Dana v. Dana, 789 
P.2d 726, 729 (Utah app. 1990); see also 
Durfee v. Durfee, 796 P.2d 713, 716 (Utah 
App. 1990) (a material change in 
circumstances contemplated in the divorce 
decree cannot be grounds for a future 
modification). 
The trial court's termination of alimony under the 
circumstances of this case was contrary to the parties' 
Stipulation, statutory law and case law, and was a clear and 
prejudicial abuse of discretion. The alimony should be 
reinstated effective from the trial court's date of termination. 
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Ill 
JOAN WILLIAMSON IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF HER ATTORNEY 
FEES AND COSTS IN THIS CASE AT TRIAL AND ON APPEAL 
The trial court accepted both parties' proffers of $1500.00 
attorney fees and costs. Without any finding of reasonableness 
or need, the trial court ordered each party to pay her/his own 
attorney fees and costs. 
Section 30-3-3 Utah Code Ann. (1994) provides that a trial 
court may award attorney fees and costs in a divorce action. In 
order to recover on her attorney fees and costs, Joan Williamson 
was required at trial to show that the fees and costs requested 
were reasonable and that Joan Williamson was financially unable 
to pay the fees and costs. Huck v. Huck, 734 P.2d 417, 419 (Utah 
1986) . 
As to reasonableness, the trail court accepted the parties' 
proffers. As to need, Joan Williamson testified that her monthly 
needs were $2,288.35 and the trial court found her monthly income 
to be $1,692.00, and awarded her $252.00 child support and 
terminated her alimony. Joan Williamson has little or no 
financial ability to pay her attorney fees and costs. 
Stuart Williamson has the greater income and income earning 
ability and has a new spouse who shares his household expenses. 
Joan Williamson, having met her burden on both 
reasonableness of the fees and costs incurred, her need, and 
Stuart Williamson's far greater ability to pay the fees and 
costs, should have been awarded all of her reasonable attorney 
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fees and costs in this matter. The trial court's failure to 
award her fees was an abuse of discretion an should be reversed. 
Joan Williamson respectfully submits that where she had a 
continuing need and Stuart Williamson's income and earning 
ability far exceeded her own, she should also be awarded a 
reasonable attorney fee and costs incurred subsequent to trial 
and in the bringing of this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Joan Williamson respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse the trial court and reinstate her $425.00 alimony as set 
forth in the parties' Stipulation and as incorporated in the 
Decree of Divorce in this case. In the alternative, Joan 
Williamson respectfully requests that this case be remanded to 
the trial court for findings on all issues material to this case. 
Also, in the alternative, Joan Williamson respectfully requests 
that the parties' current income as found by the trial court be 
equalized so that the parties' respective standards of living be 
equalized, said alimony to be indeterminate. Finally, Joan 
Williamson respectfully requests that she be awarded her attorney 
fees and costs at the trial level and on appeal. 
DATED this 14th day of December, 1998. 
HI^LYARD, A^BSRSON & OLSEN 
^arry E. gpned 
Attorney fiforyPetitioner/Appellant 
original signature 
29 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT was mailed, postpaid, to the 
following this 14th day of December, 1998: 
Mr. Pete N. Vlahos 
Attorney at Law 
2447 Kiesel Avenue 
Ogden, UT 84401 
HILLYARD, ANDERSON & OLSEN 
^Larry E. 
Attorney &h?f Petitioner/Appellant 
30 
ADDENDUM 
May 24, 1996 Decree of Divorce A 
August 29, 1996 Morton International, Inc. letter 
addressed to Stuart K. Williamson 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 4) B 
Transcript of the Trial Court's Oral Decision 
(Transcript pages 180-86) C 
March 25, 1998 Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law D 
March 25, 1998 Order Modifying Decree of Divorce . . E 
M1CR 
DATE 
ROLL 
t L a r r y E. Jo 3 # 1 7 4 5 ADDENDUM A 
HILLYARD, ANDERSON & OLSEN 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
A T T O R N E Y S A T L A W ! 
175 EAST FIRST NORTH 
L O G A N , U T A H 84321 
TELEPHONE ( 8 0 1 ) 7 5 2 - 2 6 1 0 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOAN WILLIAMSON, ) 
Plaintiff, ) DECREE OF DIVORCE 
vs. ) 
STUART KIM WILLIAMSON, ) Case No. 954 207 
Defendant. ) 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing 
on July 6, 1995. The Honorable Commissioner Daniel W. 
Garner presided. Plaintiff appeared in person and by and 
through her attorney, Larry E. Jones of Hillyard, Anderson & 
Olsen. The Court reviewed the written Stipulation of the 
parties previously filed. The Court heard evidence from 
Plaintiff. The Court now having before it the Stipulation 
of the parties, the evidence, and good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Plaintiff be and is hereby awarded a Decree of 
Divorce against Defendant, said decree to become final upon 
signing and filing by the Court. 
2. Plaintiff and Defendant are the parents of two (2) 
children as issue of this marriage, one of whom is still a 
minor, namely: Julie Williamson, born September 23, 1985. 
3. Plaintiff is awarded the care, custody and control 
of the parties' minor child, subject to Defendant having _ . 
k-(L-q{„ WY24W6 
reasonable visitation. Reasonable visitation shall be as 
set forth on the summary of statutory visitation attached 
hereto as Exhibit "A" and by this reference incorporated 
herein. Defendant shall have no visitation with the 
parties' daughter when Defendant has been or is drinking. 
M Further, in the event either party decides to move from the 
1 
5 State of Utah or 150 miles or more from the Logan, Utah 
D 
z area, Plaintiff and Defendant may agree to who will bear the 
expense for transportation for visitation purposes. If 
| Plaintiff and Defendant are not able to agree, Plaintiff and 
»-
P Defendant shall submit the matter to the Court for 
g consideration by the Court, the Court to factor in the 
in 
reason for relocation, the additional costs or difficulty to 
tn 
o Plaintiff and Defendant in exercising visitation, the 
economic resources of both parents, and any other factors z o (/) 
UJ 
g the Court may deem necessary and relevant 
< 
£ 4. Defendant shall pay to Plaintiff the sum of $368.00 
> 
j per month as child support until such time as the payments 
u are no longer due, which shall be when the child turns 18 or 
iZ 
LL 5. would graduate from high school with her normal high school 
< 
class, whichever occurs later. Said child support was 
computed in accordance with the Uniform Civil Liability for 
Support Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-1 et seq. A copy of the 
Child Support Obligation Worksheets which were averaged to 
come up with the child support in this case is attached 
hereto as Exhibits "B" and "C" and by this reference 
2 
Q^ X 
incorporated herein. Child support shall commence July 1, 
1995. 
5. In addition to the child support, Defendant shall 
pay to Plaintiff one-half the work or training-related child 
care expense for the child of the parties. Plaintiff shall 
5 provide written verification of the cost and identity of a 
5 child care provider upon initial engagement of a provider 
D 
z and thereafter on the request of Defendant. Plaintiff shall 
notify Defendant of any change of child care provider or the 
monthly expense of child care within 30 calendar days of the 
date of the change. Reimbursement to Plaintiff for 
Defendant's one-half of the child care expense shall be paid 
to Plaintiff by Defendant within ten days from receipt of 
written verification of payment by Plaintiff. So long as 
not unduly disruptive to the child care arrangement, 
2 
O 
w 
a: 
UJ § Defendant shall be entitled to provide child care for the 
< 
§ minor child, subject to Defendant having not been drinking 
or drinking when he provides the child care. 
6. Defendant shall maintain health, medical and dental 
^ insurance on the minor child of the parties. Plaintiff 
shall also maintain health, medical and dental insurance on 
the minor child of the parties when available to her at her 
place of employment at reasonable cost. Any uninsured 
expense for the minor child of the parties, including 
deductibles and copayments, shall be shared equally by the 
parties. Health, medical and dental expense is expressly 
3 
understood by the parties to include reasonable orthodontic, 
eye care, and eyeglass expenses. A parent who incurs 
uninsured health, medical or dental expenses shall provide 
written verification of the cost and payment of the 
uninsured health, medical or dental expenses to the other 
w parent within 30 days of payment. Reimbursement for one-
00 
5 half the uninsured health, medical or dental expenses shall 
H 
D 
z" be paid to the incurring parent by the other parent within 
o 
o 
ten days from the receipt of the written verification. 
7. The parties shall alternate the tax dependency 
exemption on the parties' minor child, Defendant to have the 
2 exemption in odd years beginning with 1995, and Plaintiff to 
have the exemption in even years beginning with 1996. 
8. Defendant is required to pay Plaintiff alimony in 
the sum of $425.00 per month until Plaintiff remarries or 
cohabits as defined in Utah Code Ann. § 3 0-3-5, or either 
2 party dies. Alimony shall commence July 1, 1995. 
>-
=! 9. Defendant shall instruct his employer to withhold 
from Defendant's paycheck the child support and alimony 
^ provided for herein, said child support and alimony to be 
sent by the employer to a checking account belonging to 
Plaintiff. If for any reason Defendant fails to so instruct 
his employer, or Defendant's employer declines to abide by 
said instruction, or Defendant falls into arrears in his 
payment of child support and alimony, Defendant consents to 
Plaintiff's collection of child support and alimony through 
4 
statutory income withholding as provided by Utah Code Ann. § 
62A-11-401 et seq. (1994). 
10. Defendant is awarded the real property of the 
parties, which property is located at 2740 West 5700 South, 
Wellsville, Utah 8433 9, and which is more particularly 
described on Exhibit "D" which is attached hereto and by 
5 this reference incorporated herein. Plaintiff shall provide 
i -
z to Defendant a quit-claim deed conveying any and all of her 
o 
J
. interest in the property to Defendant. Defendant shall be 
i -| obligated to pay the mortgage to First Security Bank, as 
\-
£ well as any and all taxes, insurance, or expenses or 
i -
< payments of any kind associated with the property,^ and to 
m 
indemnify and hold Plaintiff harmless therefrom. 
11. Plaintiff is awarded all personal property set 
forth on Exhibit "E" attached hereto and by this reference 
incorporated herein, her personal items and effects, as well 
as the personal property, items and effects of and for the 
minor child of the parties. 
12. Defendant is awarded all personal property set 
forth on Exhibit "F" attached hereto and by this reference 
incorporated herein, as well as his personal items and 
effects. 
13. Plaintiff and Defendant shall each be awarded a 
one-half interest in any and all retirement benefits which 
the other may have through their places of employment. Said 
interest shall be divided in accordance with the so-called 
5 
Woodward formula as set forth in the case of Woodward v. 
Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982). Each shall be awarded a 
survivor benefit at least equivalent in amount to their 
retirement interest awarded herein, said benefit to be at 
the survivor's expense. Each shall prepare and submit to 
5 the other's employer an appropriate Qualified Domestic 
CD 
5 Relation Order to accomplish and effect the distribution and 
»-
D 
z severance of said retirement interest. Each shall execute 
< 
o 
o 
any and all documents necessary for the other to obtain a 
i
S transfer of interest in said retirement. Plaintiff and 
z 
£ Defendant may each continue to name or may in the future 
£ rename the other as a beneficiary on any of the foregoing 
in 
retirement interests, the named party to have all rights as 
a beneficiary. 
0 14. The proceeds of the life insurance policies which 
ir 
§ the parties have cashed shall be used to pay the VISA 
< 
§ obligation, in the approximate sum of $4,000.00, with the 
>-
_J 
=! remainder of the insurance proceeds to be divided equally 
S between the parties. 
LL 
LL 
1 15. Plaintiff shall pay the following debts and 
< 
-j 
obligations: 
Creditor Amount 
< 
Any and all debts which Plaintiff has incurred in 
her own name since June 1, 1995. 
O"? 
s 
tn 
Plaintiff shall indemnify and hold Defendant harmless from 
the foregoing debts. 
16. Defendant shall pay the following debts and 
obligations: 
Creditor Amount 
First Security Bank $100,000.00 
As well as any and all debts which Defendant has 
Defendant shall indemnify and hold Plaintiff harmless from 
< 
D incurred in his own name since June 1, 1995, 
2 
< 
O 
o 
_] | the foregoing debts. 
o 
2 
£ 17. To pay Plaintiff for her equity interest in the 
jj parties' home, Defendant shall pay to Plaintiff the sum of 
< 
UJ 
J5 $65,000.00, said payment to be made on or before the entry 
£ of the Decree of Divorce in this matter, 
o 
18. Plaintiff and Defendant shall divide equally any 
| itemizable 1995 tax deductions which have accrued up to the 
date of the parties' divorce. 
5 19. Plaintiff shall maintain life insurance on her 
life in the sum of $18,000.00 so long as reasonably 
available from her employer, and Defendant shall maintain 
life insurance on his life in the sum of $45,000.00 so long 
as reasonably available from his employer. Plaintiff and 
Defendant shall each name the parties' minor child as the 
beneficiary on said insurance, each to be entitled to name 
trustee if desired. Plaintiff and Defendant shall provide 
each other with documentation of the insurance both as to 
amount and beneficiary designation within 3 0 days of the 
date this Decree of Divorce is entered in this case, and on 
January 1 of each calendar year commencing January 1, 1996. 
20. Plaintiff and Defendant shall each pay their own 
attorney fees and costs incurred in this matter. 
21. Each party shall act in good faith in signing and 
delivering to the other party any additional documents, 
instruments, and writings, including deeds, releases, and 
securities, which may be necessary to enforce or carry out 
the terms of the Stipulation and this document. 
22. Any party discovering any property not disclosed 
in the Stipulation or this document shall be entitled to 
petition the Court for an equitable decision of such 
property. 
23. In the event either party to this agreement 
defaults on his or her obligations hereunder, the party in 
default shall be liable to the prevailing party for all 
reasonable expenses, including attorney fees and court costs 
incurred in the enforcement of the obligations created by 
the Stipulation and the Court Decree. 
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BY THE COURT: 
Dated this ^OH day of fiT\^ajd^ 
^K^^oS>^ */&fib X l 
± 3 ^ r i c t ^ Cour t Judge 
N. Vla f ios£>" 
A t t o r n e y flor Defenda'tii:"^"* 
rrrr^?' n*» " " '
 c ^ COPY 
&•• **••'.l-j"vn lis FIRST 
Me ?'\ 
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u 
8 
h 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
U.C.A. SEC. 30-3-55 MINIMUM SCHEDULE FOR VISITATION 
(SUMMARIZED) 
Effective May 3, 1993 
Reasonable Visitation should be defined as the parents may agree. If they are not able to 
agree, the definition for school-age children (beginning kindergarten) will be as follows: 
Midweek: One weekday evening specified from 5:30 - 8:30 p.m. 
Alternate Weekends: Friday 6.-00 p.m. to Sunday 7:00 p.m. 
HOUDAYS TAKE PRECEDENCE'OVER THE WEEKEND VISITATION AND 
THE ALTERNATING WEEKEND SCHEDULE DOES N O T CHANGE. 
Holiday Visitation: (6:00 p.m. day before the holiday to 7:00 p.m. of the 
holiday unless specified otherwise) 
ODD NUMBERED YEARS 
Human Rights Day 
Easter from Fri 6:00 p.m. to 
Sun 7:00 p.m. 
Memorial Day Fri 6:00 p.m. to 
Mon 7:00 p.m. 
July 24th to 11:00 p.m. 
Veteran's Day 
Day before or after child's birthday 
3:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m. 
First half Christmas Vacation, including 
Christmas Eve and Christmas Day 
to 1:00 p.m. 
EVEN NUMBERED YEARS 
New Year's Day 
President's Day 
July 4th to 11:00 p.m. 
Labor Day from Fri 6:00 to 
Mon. 7:00 p.m. 
Columbus Day 
UEA weekend from Wed 6:00 p.m. 
to Sun 7:00 p.m. 
Child's actual Birthday to 9:00 p.m. 
Thanksgiving from Wed 7:00 pm. 
to Sun 7:00 p.m. 
Second Half Christmas Vacation 
beginning 1:00 p.m. Christmas Day 
Father's Day: 
Mother's Day: 
Summer: 
With Father 9:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. 
With Mother 9:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. 
4 weeks during summer or, if year round, 1/2 school breaks, custodial, 
parent allowed two weeks uninterrupted. Notification of summer 
visitation or vacation weeks with children should be provided in 
writing to the other parent at least 30 days in advance. 
Telephone- Contact at reasonable hours 
U N I F O R M VISITATION GUIDELINES 
1993 
F u r t h e r Clarifications: 
FAMILY F U N C T I O N S : Special consideration shall be given each parent to make the 
child available to attend family functions including funerals, weddings, family reunions, 
religious holidays,.important ceremonies, and other significant events in the life of the 
child or in the life of cither parent which, may inadvertently conflict with the visitation 
schedule; 
P I C K U P / R E T U R N : The noncustodial parent shall pick up the child at the times 
specified and return the child at the time specified, and the child's regular school hours 
shall not be interrupted; 
R E C O R D S / R E P O R T S : The custodial parent shall notify the noncustodial parent 
within 24 hours of receiving notice of all significant school, social, sports and community 
functions in which the child is participating or being honored, and the noncustodial parent 
shall be entitled to attend and participate fully; 
C H A N G E O F ADDRESS: Each parent shall provide the other with his current 
address and telephone number within 24 hours of any change; 
C H I L D CARE: Parental care shall be presumed to be better care for the child 
than surrogate care and the court shall encourage the parties to cooperate in allowing the 
noncustodial parent, if willing and able, to provide child care; 
RELIGIOUS HOLIDAYS: Each parent shall be entitled to an equal division of major 
religious holidays celebrated by the parents, and the parent who celebrates a religious 
holiday that the other parent does not celebrate shall have the right to be together with the 
child on the religious holiday. 
Q i 
EXHIBIT "B" 
IN THE FTKST DISTRICT COURT 
CACTP; COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOAN WILLIAMSON 
vs. 
STUART KIM WILLIAMSON 
CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION WORKSHE^ 
(SOLE CUSTODY AND PATERNITY)" 
Civil No. 'QS4 ->(\n 
11. Enter the £ of natural and adopted children of this 
mother and father for whom support is to be awarded. 
J 2a. Enter the father's and mother's gross monthly 
income. Refer to Instructions for definition of 
[j income. 
2b. Enter previously ordered alimony that is actually 
paid. (Do not enter alimony ordered for this case) . 
2c. Enter previously ordered child support. (Do not 
[enter obligations ordered for the children in Line 1) . 
|2d. OPTIONAL: Enter the amount froa Line 12 of the 
Children in Present Home Worksheet for either parent. 
3. Subtract Lines 2b, 2c, and 2d from 2a. This £s the 
Adjusted Gross Income for child support purposes, j 
<. Take the COMBINED figure in Line 3 and the nuaber 
of children in Line 1 to the Support Table. Find the* 
Base Combined Support Obligation. Enter it here. | 
5. Divide each parent's adjusted monthly gross in Line 
3 by the COMBINED adjusted monthly gross in Line 3. 
6. Multiply Line < by Line 5 for each parent to obtain 
each parent's share of the Base Support Obligation. | 
MOTHER 
1/////////// 
/ / / / / / / / / / / 
Is 
1442 
U 
| -
-
1442 j 
/////////// I 
/////////// 
/////////// 
29.18
 v 
$ 155.82 
FATHER 
[/////////// 
(/////////// 
$ 
3550 
-
$ 
3500 . | 
/ / / / / / / / / / / ! 
/ / / / / / / / / / / 
/ / / / / / / / / / / 
70.82
 v 
5 378.18 
' COM3INED 
1 
/////////// 
\ / / / / / / / / / / j 
//////////. 
////////// 
//////////. 1////////// 
//////////. 
////////// 
$ 
4942 
534 
//////////, 
//////////, 
//////////. 
////////// 
7. BASE rmrm SUPPORT AHARD: Bring down the amount in Line 6 
for the .Obligor Parent or enter-the amount from -the Low Income 
Table. 
378.18 
8. 
5. 
10. 
Which parent is the obligor? ( ) Mother ( ) Father 
Is the support award ordered different froa the guideline account in Line 7? 
( J Yes ( ] Ko If YES, enter the amount ordered: $ 
What were the reasons stated by the Court for the deviation? 
( ) property settlement 
( ) excessive debts of the marriage 
( ) absence of need of the custodial parent 
( } other: ' , 
Attorney Bar No.-
7/J 4 
( ) Electronic filing ( } Manual filing 
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EXHIBIT "D 
WHEN RECORDED RETURN TO: 
SEND TAX NOTICES TO 
QUIT-CLAIM DEED 
JOAN WILLIAMSON, Grantor, of Cache County, State of Utah, 
hereby quit-claims to STUART KIM WILLIAMSON, Grantee, for the sum 
of Ten Dollars ($10.00) and ot2her good and valuable 
consideration, the following described tract of land in Cache 
County, State of Utah: 
SEE ATTACHED FOR THE LEGAL DESCRIPTION, 
WHICH BY THIS REFERENCE IS MADE A PART HEREOF. 
WITNESS, the hand of said Grantor, this day of 
, 1995. 
JOAN WILLIAMSON 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
County of Cache ) 
On the day of May, , personally appeared 
before me JOAN WILLIAMSON, the signer of the within instrument, 
who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
g:\data\lej\williamson.dee 
Legal Description for parcel 10-013-0008 
U 5700 3: 27,0 UELLSVILLE - Tax Rate :0.012027: 
i T ION .R 1U N 023 FT TM ELY ALG S GNK OF CANAL 
260 f*T S GOO FT 
OEG *U COR OF THE SE /4 ^ SE C ^ ^ - - ^ -
 g J T H R / u G . 0 G A C 
w 
EXHIBIT "E" 
PERSONAL PROPERTY ITEMS TO BE 
AWARDED TO JOAN WILLIAMSON 
1990 Chevrolet Blazer 
All personal property agreed upon 
All personal items and effects 
All personal property items and effects of and for Julie 
lej\williamsor\.exd 
EXHIBIT p 
PERSONAL PROPERTY ITEMS TO BE 
AWARDED TO STUART WILLIAMSON 
1982 GMC 4x4 Truck 
Snowplow 
Horse Trailer 
Camping Trailer 
1982 Chevrolet Capri automobile 
All personal property agreed upon 
All personal items and effects 
lej\williamson.exe 
ADDENDUM B 
IMorton 
August 29, 1996 
Stuart K. Williamson 
2740 West 5700 South 
Wellsville, UT 84339 
Dear Kim: 
This letter is to inform you of your involuntary termination of employment with Morton Automotive 
Safety Products effettive today, August 29, 1996. This action was taken as a violation of Company 
Policy; specifically unsatisfactory performance of job responsibilities. 
As a severance package you will receive the following: 
2 weeks of pay in lieu of notice 
6 weeks of pay (one week for each year of service) 
8 Total 
Information regarding your medical insurance and the Employee Savings and Investment Plan (if 
applicable) will be mailed to you separately. 
We regret that your actions have brought us to this conclusioa If you are dissatisfied with any aspect 
of your termination, you may review the Morton Automotive Safety Products Employee Handbook 
as it pertains to the Employee Grievance Process. 
Sincerely,
 (• 
Judfith A. Mueller, Manager 
Employee Relations 
Morton A utomotive Safety Products 
Morton International. Inc.. .v>7) Airport Rthul. O^lcn. I T . W W StU rt_Y~/,v//; /-./.v ,*>"/ ••»;/-• 
CASE NO. 
OAJEBBCD 
I W EVIDENCE ^Zz^ZZf 
[CLERK 
ADDENDUM C 
1 || THE JUDGE: You offered EXHIBIT #2 and 
2 || EXHIBIT #3 but you just didn't EXHIBIT #1. 
3 II MR. VLAHOS: I don't see where EXHIBIT #1 
4 went but I offered all three of them. 
5 THE JUDGE: Wherever it may be let's make 
6 certain that that's introduced, given to the Court 
7 before you leave. 
8 MR. VLAHOS: I gave the Court a copy and 
9 I--
10 COURT'S RULING 
11 THE JUDGE: Now in ruling on this let me 
12 indicate, Mr. Vlahos, I'll direct that you prepare 
13 the findings and conclusions. 
14 J Court does find that there has been a 
15 change of circumstances and I will adjust the child 
16 support as follows: For purposes of child support 
17 the income of mother should be $1,643, for the 
18 father it should be $2,090.^ That's per month. 
19 And quite frankly I'm not quite sure where we came 
20 up with $1,643. All of the calculations I make 
21 show that she makes in excess of that. 
22 II MR. VLAHOS: I apologize. I made an 
23 || error. I apologize. 
24 || THE JUDGE: But Mr. Vlahos prepared it 
25 || and I think he's, I'm going to stick him with his 
PENNY C. ABBOTT, CSR/TRANSCRIBER 
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1 II figure. 
2 || For the purposes of alimony I've 
3 [j calculated, and I'd like this shown in the findings 
4 and conclusions, Mr. Vlahos, that her actual income 
5 last year was $1,832.66 per month. But from her 
6 testimony that she is now making $1,692.56 per 
7 month. But that is the $75 from King's on a 
8 monthly basis and $70 per month as overtime at her 
9 regular employment. The Court is--
10 MR. VLAHOS: That figure is what? Comes 
11 up to a total of what, Your Honor?-
12 THE JUDGE: There's three figures that 
13 should be reflected. Number one is that the 
14 Court's going to accept $1,643 which is the figure 
15 you proposed for her income. I note that the 
16 actual income shown from the W-2s last year show 
17 that her income was $1,832.66. From her testimony 
18 her income this year would be $1,692.56. And I've 
19 calculated that at $70 from the, per month for 
20 overtime and $75 per month from King's. That's 
21 what she testified to. 
22 I'm going to terminate alimony. Now to 
23 |] make this effective, and the Court paints this in 
24 It broad strokes, I've often said that in the past and 
25 II I'll reemphasize that here today. Mr. Vlahos, I'm 
PENNY C. ABBOTT, CSR/TRANSCRIBER 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
, 5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
show not sure, has your client paid the child 
support for February? 
MR. VLAHOS: He's paid--
MR. KIM WILLIAMSON: For February I paid 
child support and alimony, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: For February? 
MR. VLAHOS: He testified that he sold his 
truck and paid it. 
THE JUDGE: All right. The child support 
will be effective as of March 1st, the reduction in 
child support. The alimony I want you to 
calculate that out and whatever he's paid that is 
when, up to, that is when I'm going to terminate 
alimony. In other words, he doesn't pay any more 
alimony but she doesn't owe him any rebates in 
what's been paid up to this point in time. 
MR. VLAHOS: So alimony will terminate 
and offset retroactively to what owes her? 
THE JUDGE: To whatever he owes. I'm 
just going to say that whatever he's paid in the 
past she may keep, she doesn't owe him anything. 
But I can't ascertain from what you've told me what 
date that would be effective as of so calculate 
that. And in other words, she keeps what she's got 
and he doesn't have to pay any more. 
PENNY C. ABBOTT, CSR/TRANSCRIBER 
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1 || Each party to pay their own costs of court 
2 || and attorney's fees. Mr. Vlahos, will you prepare 
3 II t h e - -
4 MR. JONES: Your Honor, I have a couple 
5 of questions if I may. 
6 THE JUDGE: Go ahead. 
7 MR. JONES: First we have the health, 
8 medical and dental on the child. That should be 
9 included with the child support? 
10 THE JUDGE: It should be. 
11 MR. VLAHOS: If his wife can get it, Your 
12 Honor, can we allow that to happen? 
13 THE JUDGE: Certainly. 
14 J MR. VLAHOS: Okay. She's applied for 
15 it. They've only been married a month so... 
16 THE JUDGE: Hopefully that will come 
17 about. 
18 MR. KIM WILLIAMSON: I'll have her apply 
19 and put her name on it. 
20 THE JUDGE: Yes. Hopefully that will 
21 If come about. 
22 II MR. JONES: Your Honor and I, and I'm 
23 || going to question the Court on this one. If Your 
24 || Honor finds the $1,692.56 on hers and the $2,090 on 
25 || his, that's still a $400 income disparity. This 
PENNY C. ABBOTT, CSR/TRANSCRIBER 
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1 II was a 24 year marriage. 
2 || THE JUDGE: I appreciate that, Counsel, 
3 II but when you take into account the child support 
4 II that he would pay and that she would receive and 
5 their actual incomes, etcetera, the Court finds 
6 that's close enough. 
7 MR. JONES: Well but even if you do that, 
8 Your Honor, you take $200 off of hers you'd end up 
9 with $1,443. Take $250 off of his you end up at 
10 $1, 840 . 
11 THE JUDGE: They're within $100. 
12 MR. JONES: You're still $400. 
13 THE JUDGE: No you're not, Counsel. 
14 Your figures are different than mine. 
15 MR. JONES: Well I'm, I'm looking at the 
16 child support worksheet, Your Honor. What Your 
1 7 j j Honor sail v: as, and I - - Please jusu hear :^ e cut. 
18 THE JUDGE: Sure! 
19 MR. JONES: I'm not trying to argue with 
20 the Court. 
2 1 II THE JUDGE: Go ahead. 
22 I! MR. JONES: But I have a real concern 
23 || here because I think that the Court's ruling is 
24 || clearly contrary to the case law--
25 || THE JUDGE: All right. 
PENNY C. ABBOTT, CSR/TRANSCRIBER 
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MR. JONES: 
THE JUDGE: 
making $2,100 gross 
MR. JONES: 
THE JUDGE: 
-- in a long-term marriage. 
All right. He's basically 
$2,100 . 
She's basically making $1,700 
gross. 
out 
MR. JONES: Oh, well now you're rounding 
THE JUDGE: Yes. 
MR. JONES: But say it's the $400, $2,100 
and $1,700. You take $200 off of hers for her 
child support that makes it 15. You take $200, it 
would be $270 or something off of his, that makes 
it 18. $300. 21 minus 3 is 18. 17 minus 2 is 
15. So there's $300 even on your, your numbers 
that you're essentially spinning up. There's 
still an income disparity of $300 bending over 
backwards to his numbers. • 
THE JUDGE: Well I appreciate your 
manipulation. But he's making $2,100, she's making 
$1,700. He gives her $250, she gets $250. And 
he's $100 in the hole. That's the way the Court 
looks at it. 
MR. JONES: Well but Your Honor, but that 
doesn't--
PENNY C. ABBOTT, CSR/TRANSCRIBER 
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THE JUDGE: End of story, Mr. Jones. 
Court will be in recess. 
MR. VLAHOS: Thank you, Your Honor. 
WHEREUPON, the hearing was concluded. 
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L a r r y E . J c ~* s # 1 7 4 5 ADDENDUM B 
HILLYARD, ANDcRSON « OLSEN 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
A T T O R N E Y S A T L A W 
175 EAST FIRST NORTH 
L O G A N , U T A H 8 4 3 21 
TELEPHONE (801) 752-2610 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOAN WILLIAMSON, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STUART KIM WILLIAMSON, ] 
Respondent. ] 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 954 207 
Judge Clint S. Judkins 
THIS MATTER, having come on regularly for trial on the 
11th day of February, 1998, before the Honorable Clint S. 
Judkins, Judge of the above-entitled Court, sitting without 
a jury; and the Petitioner appearing in person and with her 
attorney, Larry E. Jones, and the Respondent appearing in 
person and with his attorney, Pete N. Vlahos; and it having 
been shown that the Respondent had previously filed a 
Petition to Modify and then, by leave of Court, having filed 
an Amended Petition to Modify; and each of the parties 
having been sworn and testifying; exhibits having been 
offered and received; witnesses having been called by both 
parties; arguments having been made; and the Court being 
fully cognizant of all matters pertaining therein, enters 
the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Petitioner and Respondent were divorced May 24, 
1996. 
MAR 251998 
-•-foAii n ; ;-•• r* • 
m 12 ii o P:? .-; 
•> ^ r t l <JU 
2. There was one minor child born as issue of the 
marriage, TO WIT: Julie Williamson, born September 23, 1985. 
3. The Petitioner was awarded the care, custody, and 
control of said minor child, subject to the respondent's 
right to visit. 
4. The Respondent was ordered to pay to the petitioner 
N the sum of $368.00 per month as and for child support, and 
00 
* also $425.00 per month as and for alimony. 
\-
z 5. At the time of t,he divorce, the Respondent was 
earning $3,550.00 per month, and the Petitioner was earning 
o $1,442.00 per month. 
S 6. Since the Decree was entered, there has been a 
u. 
< substantial change of circumstances, in that respondent was 
in 
terminated from Morton, and that he no longer earns 
z 
u 
5 $3,440.00. 
o 7. The Respondent has obtained employment with 
U) 
a 
u 
| Williamson Drywall, and the Respondent's income is $11:00 
per hour. The Court finds that with the overtime, the 
Respondent earns $2,090.00 per month. 
in 
u 8. The Respondent's last year's (1997) income based on 
EZ 
LL 
^ the tax returns is $1,832.66 per month. 
< 
5. The Petitioner's current income is $1,692.00 per 
month which includes a part-time job, where she earns $75 
per month, and also overtime averaging $70.00 per month. 
10. The Respondent's income is based on overtime and 
his income in the year 1997. 
2 
11. The Court finds that there has been a substantial 
change of circumstance. 
12. Based on the substantial change of circumstance, 
the alimony that respondent was ordered to pay to the 
Petitioner shall terminate. 
13. Based on the parties "now" income, the support 
« shall be reduced to $252.06 plus Petitioner's out-of-pocket 
<* 
CD 
g medical insurance expense on the parties' daughter bringing 
i-
D 
z child support to a total .of $271.64 per month effective 
o 
o 
March 1, 1998. A copy of the Child Support Worksheet is 
i 
§ attached hereto Exhibit "A" and by this reference 
z 
W
 -. . . 
£ incorporated, herein. 
< 14. The Court finds that the termination of alimony 
should be effective immediately with Petitioner to keep what 
she has been paid to date and Respondent to owe no more. 
15. Each of the parties has incurred attorney fees and 
Id 
Z 
LJ 
<J) 
_J 
O 
tf 
z 
o 
W 
a: 
UJ 
1 the Court finds that each should be required to pay their 
< 
2 own. 
< 
16. The Respondent will have health and accident 
insurance in effect, approximately the 1st day of March, 
i 
CO 
UJ 
y 
iZ 
£ 1998, which he will receive through his present wife's 
< 
employment and that if the petitioner has to pay health and 
accident insurance for the minor child, then the standard 
medical shall be adopted. The Respondent would be obligated 
to pay one-half of the costs of the health and accident 
insurance for the minor child only, with the Petitioner to 
provide the Respondent verification. 
3 
FROM THE ABOVE AND FOREGOING Findings of Fact, the 
Court arrives at the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. There has been a substantial change of 
circumstances on the part of the Petitioner and the 
Respondent, since the entry of the Divorce Decree. 
2. Effective as of the month of February, 1998. the 
CO 
GO 
5 Respondent's obligation to pay the Petitioner alimony 
D 
z terminates. 
o 
i 3. Effective as of March 1, 1998, the child support 
| shall be $271.64, rather than the $368.00 as set forth in 
E the Decree of Divorce. 
< 4. Any payments the Respondent made to the Petitioner 
re-
made to the Respondent on alimony shall stand and the 
z 
hi 
3 Respondent will not be allowed to go retroactive. 
5. Whatever the payments the Respondent have made and z o 
(0 
Q whatever payments the Respondent has received as and for 
£ alimony shall be a wash, with no obligation owed by either 
4 party. 
o 6. Each party shall assume and pay their own attorney 
fees and costs. 
7. If the Respondent's wife obtains insurance for the 
minor child, he shall maintain it, also. 
Dated this Z H da^g^^^.YT^A 1998 
m 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was 
mailed, postage prepaid to the following this /?/ day of 
March, 1998: 
Pete N. Vlahos 
Attorney at Law 
cj 2447 Kiesel Avenue . 
S Ogden, UT 84401 A v 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
Ii. THE FIRST JUDICAL DISTRICT! COURT 
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOAN WILLIAMSON, ) 
) CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION WORKSHEET 
VS. (SOLE CUSTODY AND PATERNITY) 
) 
STUART KIM WILLIAMSON, ) Civil No. 9541000207 
MOTHER FATHER COMBINED 
1. Enter the # natural and adopted children of this || mother and father for whom support is to be awarded. 
2a. Enter the father's and mother's gross monthly 
income. Refer to Instructions for definition of 
II income. 
2b. Enter previously ordered alimony that is 
actually paid. (Do not enter alimony ordered for 
|| this case) . 
2c. Enter previously ordered child support. (Do not 
enter obligations ordered for the children in Line 
1) . 
2d. OPTIONAL: Enter the amount from line 12 of the 
Children in Present Home Worksheet for either 
|| parent. 
3. Subtract Lines 2b, 2c, and 2d from 2a. This is 
the Adjusted Gross Income for child support 
purposes. ! 
. Take the COMBINED figure in Line 3 and the number 
of children in Line 1 to the Support Table. Find 
the Base Combined Support Obligation. Enter it 
|| here. 
5. Divided each parent's adjusted monthly gross in 
Line 3 by the COMBINED adjusted monthly gross in 
I  Line 3 . | 
6. Multiply Line 4 by Line 5 for each parent to 
obtain each parent's share of the Base Support 
J Obligation. J 
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
| $1,643.00 
$1,643.00 
44% 
$199.00 
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
$2,090.00 
$2,090.00 
56% 
$252.06 
1 
I ill 
:
 il
 '
 J
 [WXi 
$3,733.00 
7. BASE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD: Bring down the amount in 
Line 6 for the Obligor Parent or enter the amount from the 
Low Income Table. 
8. Which parent is the obligor? () Mother 0 Father 
9. Is the support award ordered different from the guideline amount in Line 7? 
() Yes () No If YES, enter the amount ordered: $__ 
10. What were the reasons stated by the Court for the deviation? 
() property settlement 
() excessive debts of the marriage 
() absence of need of the custodial parent 
() other: 
Attorney Bar No. 0 Electronic filing 0 Manual filing 
$271.64 
'*\D\ 
L a r r y E. Jc s #1745 
HILLYARD, ANDfcRSON & OLSEN 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
A T T O R N E Y S A T L A V / 
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TELEPHONE (801) 752-2610 
ADDENDUM E 
i r 
•OGAN DISIRICI 
fi« \l 4 38 P|| '% 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOAN WILLIAMSON, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STUART KIM WILLIAMSON, 
Respondent-. 
ORDER MODIFYING 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Case No. 954 207 
Judge Clint S. Judkins 
MICRd 
THIS MATTER, having come on regularly for trial on the 
11th day of February, 1998, before the Honorable Clint S. 
Judkins, Judge of the above-entitled Court, sitting without 
a jury; and the Petitioner appearing in person and with her 
attorney, Larry E. Jones, and the Respondent appearing in 
person and with his attorney, Pete N. Vlahos; and each of 
the parties having been sworn and testifying; exhibits ^ 
having been offered and received; witnesses having been 
called; arguments having been made to the Court; and the 
Court having rendered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, separately stated in writing. 
NOW THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 
DECREED as follows: 
1. There has been a substantial change of 
circumstances since the entry of the Decree of Divorce. 
2. Effective as of the month of February, 1998, the 
Respondent's obligation to pay the Petitioner alimony 
^ C 5 f !>i^ _-»•_> -. 
"•! A^g* m i n a t e s • —:"'" 
"'~"~3A^fl MAR Z 5 199ft DATE: 
-7 7 
3. Effective as of March 1, 1998, the child support 
shall be $252.00, rather than the $368.00 as set forth in 
the Decree of Divorce. 
4. Any payments the Respondent made to the Petitioner 
made to the Respondent on alimony shall stand and the 
Respondent will not be allowed to be retroactive. 
« 5. Whatever the payments the Respondent have made and 
I 
J whatever payments the Respondent has received as and for 
D 
z alimony shall be a wash,^with no obligation owed by either 
o 
o 
J
. party. 
X H K 
o 6. Each party shall assume and pay their own attorney 
i -
E fees and costs. 
< 7. If the Respondent's wife obtains insurance for the 
minor child, he shall maintain it, also. 
§ Dated this Z^T day of W l V T ^ 1998. 
| ^ r f ^ O F ^ . B Y THE COURT^ 
Ul 
o 
z 
< 
Q 
< 
„ ^ M I&&(^CERT IFICATE 
t I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
5 foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was 
mailed, postage prepaid to the following this /J. ~~"~day of 
en 
March, 1998: 
Pete N. Vlahos 
Attorney at Law 
2447 Kiesel Avenue 
Ogden, UT 84401 ^ /> 
Secretary 
lej\crder\williamson.ord 
a< ••^-
